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IMPLICATIONS OF COUNTY VARIANCE IN
NEW JERSEY CAPITAL MURDER CASES:
ARBITRARY DECISION-MAKING BY
COUNTY PROSECUTORS
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional constitutional challenges to the administration of
capital punishment in New Jersey have often alleged racial bias in
death sentencing.' Death penalty laws that discriminate against spe-
cific racial or ethnic groups will not survive the scrutiny of the high
benchmarks of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S.
Constitution.2 Supreme Court Justice Stewart, in his concurring
opinion in Furman v. Georgia, explained that the Eighth Amend-
ment ban on "Cruel or Unusual Punishment" and the Fourteenth
Amendment's extension of equal protection to the states involved
two protections from discrimination. He explained that the Consti-
tution banned not only all forms of intentional (de jure) racial dis-
crimination by the states in the administration of their capital
punishment systems but that capital punishment should not operate
to produce results that are freakish, unpredictable, and arbitrary.
3
Thirty years since Furman, in states such as New Jersey, data has
revealed a new form of such arbitrariness: substantial geographic
disparity in the rates of capital murder prosecution by county prose-
cutors throughout New Jersey's twenty-one counties.
With the reintroduction of capital punishment in 1982,4 the
New Jersey Supreme Court was statutorily required to conduct ap-
pellate review. It is through this mandate that the New Jersey Su-
preme Court developed more fully the process of conducting
1 See DAVID C. BALDUS, Special Master, Death Penalty Proportionality
Review Project, Final Report to the New Jersey Supreme Court (Sept. 24, 1991)
[hereinafter BALDUS FINAL REPORT].
2 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306-310 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(detailing that laws making blacks, having the equivalent of no more than fifth
grade education, eligible for the death penalty, is unconstitutional).
3 See id. at 310.
4 See The New Jersey Capital Punishment Act of 1982, N.J STAT. ANN.
§ 2C: 11-3 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003).
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individual proportionality review of all death sentences. 5 The Su-
preme Court of New Jersey has since appointed two special masters
to study unsettling evidence of racial discrimination that arose in
the course of its proportionality reviews. The most recent study
conducted by the Special Master for Proportionality Review, Hon-
orable David S. Baime, J.A.D. ("Special Master"), 6 on behalf of the
New Jersey Supreme Court, found that statistical evidence strongly
supports the conclusion that "racial discrimination per se does not
exist.' 7 In fact, the Special Master found that no racial or ethnic
disparities exist in the rates of capital prosecution or death sentenc-
ing.8 Nevertheless, some evidence did indicate a correlation be-
tween the race of victim and an increased rate in death sentencing.
In a most interesting twist, however, the Special Master concluded
that this inference was rebutted by another confounding factor:
county variance. 9
Although the New Jersey Supreme Court did not request that
Special Master Baime investigate this further and recommended
the matter to the Attorney General, the fact remains that county
variance may provide a formidable constitutional challenge to the
death penalty in New Jersey.10 Significant geographic variation in
the rates at which county prosecutors seek the death pen-
alty"creates a strong inference of "arbitrary" and "capricious" ap-
5 See State v. Cooper, 731 A.2d 1000 (N.J. 1999); State v. Ramseur, 524
A.2d 188, 227-28 (N.J. 1987).
6 The Honorable David S. Baime, J.A.D., is the presiding judge of the New
Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division. He is also noted for hearing the first
death penalty case, State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188 (N.J. 1987), under the new
death penalty statute.
7 DAVID S. BAIME, SPECIAL MASTER, REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SU-
PREME COURT: SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 2000-2001 TERM
(June 1, 2001) [hereinafter BAIME III]; see PROFESSOR DAVID WEISBURD & PRO-
FESSOR JOSEPH NAus, REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT: SYSTEMIC
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 2000-2001, TECHNICAL APPENDIX.
8 BAIME III, supra note 7, at 50.
9 Id. at 35-36, 41-50. County variance means geographic variation in the
rates at which prosecutors in New Jersey seek the death penalty in proportion to
the total number of death-eligible cases that arise within their jurisdictions. Special
Master Baime's report showed variation in counties that he classified as urban, less
urban, and rural areas. Id.
10 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (holding that nondiscrimina-
tory statutes that operate to discriminate against classes of persons implicitly vio-
late the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee).
11 BAIME III, supra note 7, at 50-51 (concluding that county variability exists
in the rates that cases progress to the sentencing proceeding; counties with a large
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plication of law.12 Consider the implications: criminal offenders that
commit identical crimes in different parts of the State may or may
not face the death penalty based solely on where the crime is prose-
cuted. The offender is not, however, the only potential victim of this
arbitrariness. The citizens of the State of New Jersey enjoy varying
degrees of protection by the action or inaction of their county pros-
ecutors. The New Jersey Supreme Court and the Office of the At-
torney General must determine the cause(s) of county variance and
its effect on constitutional rights.13
This Note examines how the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion has created an environment of arbitrariness, unpredictability,
and inequality that has infected the administration of the death
penalty in New Jersey. Part II of this Note discusses the develop-
ment of the death penalty in New Jersey, focusing on the statutory
capital murder provisions as they relate to prosecutorial discre-
tion.14 It also discusses the existing limitations, or lack thereof, on
prosecutorial discretion imposed by the New Jersey Constitution,
by statutes, and by the guidelines adopted by county prosecutors to
assist them in capital prosecution decisions. 15 Part III of the Note
discusses how the evidence of geographic variation in capital prose-
cution rates, in New Jersey and in other states, may offend federal
and state constitutional rights.16 Since the cause(s) of the county
variation and the implications on the denial of constitutional rights
are unclear, the State of New Jersey must devote sufficient re-
sources to investigating this phenomenon further. Part IV of this
Note advances several proposed modifications to both the capital
murder statutes and the county prosecutor guidelines promulgated
number of African-American victim cases have low rates of cases advancing to a
penalty trial while less urban counties with a high concentration of white victim
cases have higher rates of capital prosecutions).
12 Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 227 (1976).
13 See BAIME III, supra note 7, at 51-52.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 18-65; see generally The New Jersey
Capital Punishment Act of 1982, N.J STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (West 1995 & Supp.
2003).
15 See New Jersey County Prosecutor Association, Guidelines for the Desig-
nation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prosecution (1989) [hereinafter PROSECU-
TORS' GUIDELINES] (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human
Rights).
16 See BAIME III, supra note ,7, at 50-52; infra text accompanying notes 66-
1 39.
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by the Attorney General and County Prosecutor's Association. 17 In
addition, studies conducted by other states on prosecutorial discre-
tion and county variance are reviewed. 18 This Note concludes that
the existing laws and regulations have failed to channel
prosecutorial discretion and have resulted in the arbitrary applica-
tion of New Jersey's death penalty laws.
II. BACKGROUND
A. New Jersey's Capital Murder Scheme
In 1972, a major shift in the jurisprudence of capital punish-
ment occurred when the U.S. Supreme Court struck down racially
discriminatory Georgia death penalty laws in Furman v. Georgia
that violated the Eighth Amendment ban on "Cruel and Unusual
Punishment.' 9 While the Court refused to invalidate the death
penalty per se, it made clear that all death penalty laws that disad-
vantaged any "unpopular groups" were intolerable under the U.S.
Constitution.2 0 It would seem quite obvious that the Court required
that the highest level of protection be afforded to those who are
condemned to die by state law.
This decision prompted lawmakers nationwide to respond to
the Court's implicit declaration that each state reconsider its capital
punishment laws, with particular consideration given to eradicating
racial bias.21 In Gregg v. Georgia, the Court sustained a Georgia
death penalty statute establishing a system of "aggravating and mit-
17 See infra text accompanying notes 140-64.
18 See Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission, Virginia General As-
sembly, Review of Virginia's System of Capital Punishment (Comm'n Draft Dec.
10, 2001) [hereinafter VIRGINIA REVIEW]; DAVID C. BALDUS ET AL., THE Disposi-
TION OF NEBRASKA CAPITAL AND NON-CAPITAL HOMICIDE CASES (1973-1999),
FINAL REPORT, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (2001) [hereinafter NEBRASKA STUDY].
19 408 U.S. 238, 238-240 (1972) (abrogating a Georgia statute permitting de-
fendants to be sentenced to death at the unfettered discretion of the judge or jury
was a violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishment).
20 The high service rendered by the 'cruel and unusual' punishment clause of
the Eighth Amendment is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are even-
handed, nonselective, and non-arbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that
general laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.
Id. at 256 (Douglas, J., concurring).
21 See Gregg v. Georgia.428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
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igating factors"2 2 and of mandatory appellate review of all death
sentences by an appellate court.23 Over the next twenty years, capi-
tal statutes were enacted by twenty-five states, all including a sys-
tem of statutory factors and appellate review.24 It was widely
perceived during this time that the U.S. Supreme Court would not
uphold capital punishment statutes that lacked such provisions. 25
In 1982, New Jersey followed a majority of other states and
adopted section 2C:11-3 of the N.J. Code of Criminal Justice, a
model of the statute upheld in Gregg,26 which incorporates aggra-
vating and mitigating factors27 and mandatory appellate review of
22 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (holding that a system designed to balance the
existence of aggravating features against the presence of any mitigating circum-
stances to determine death worthiness is constitutionally permissible). Aggravating
factors act as a direct limit on prosecutorial discretion because they limit the types
of death-eligible offenses for which the death penalty may be sought. Id.
23 See id.
24 See ALA. CODE §13A-5-53(b)(3) (Michie 1994) (enacted 1981); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-46b (West 2001) (enacted 1980); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11
§ 4209(g)(2)(a) (2001) (enacted 1977); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1997)
(enacted 1973); IDAHO CODE 19-2827(c)(3) (Michie 1997) (enacted 1977); Ky.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.075(3)(c) (Michie 1999) (enacted 1976); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 905.9 (West 1997) (enacted 1976); MD. ANN. CODE, art. 27,
§ 414(e)(4) (current version at MD. CODE ANN., CRiM. LAW § 2-401 (2002)) (en-
acted 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.035 (West 1999) (enacted 1983); MONT. CODE
ANN. § 46-18-310(1)(c) (2001) (enacted 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2521.03
(2002) (enacted 1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 177.055(2)(d) (2001) (enacted 1977);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-4(c)(4) (Michie 2000) (enacted 1979); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000(d)(2) (2001) (enacted 1977); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.05(A)
(Anderson 2002) (enacted 1981); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.13(C)(3) (cur-
rent version at tit. 21, § 701.13 (West 2002)) (enacted 1976); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 23A-27A-12(3) (Michie 1998) (enacted 1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-
206(c)(1)(D) (1997) (enacted 1977); VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-313(A) (Michie 1999)
(enacted 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.130(2)(b) (West 2002) (enacted
1981); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-103(d)(iii) (enacted 1982) (current version at § 6-2-
103 (Michie 2001)).
25 See State v. Loftin, 724 A.2d 129, 139 (N.J. 1999) (citing Senate Judiciary
Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 950 (L. 1985, c. 178)); Leigh B. Bienen,
The Proportionality Review of Capital Cases by State High Courts After Gregg:
Only "The Appearance of Justice," 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 130, 140 (1996).
26 See The New Jersey Capital Punishment Act of 1982, N.J STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:11-3 (West 1995 & Supp. 2003).
27 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(a)-(l) (West 1995 & Supp. 2003) (list-
ing the statutory aggravating factors that may be found by the jury or by the
court); § 2C:11-3(c)(5)(a)-(h) (listing the statutory mitigating factors that the de-
fendant may introduce evidence of, to the jury or court).
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all death sentences by the New Jersey Supreme Court.28 Section
2C:11-3 established a bifurcated trial or two-part capital murder
trial, notwithstanding the requirement that a county prosecutor
seek a criminal indictment for capital murder if he chooses to seek
the death penalty. First, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant "purposefully" or "knowingly" "caused
death or serious bodily injury resulting in death" 29 or that the de-
fendant committed the murder in the course of and in furtherance
to the commission of one of the predicated felonies. 30 So, a person
who purchased a gun, went to the victim's home intending to shoot
him, and does shoot and kill him, would most likely be found guilty
of the pre-meditation requirements of section 2C:11-3. Second, the
State must also prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant committed the murder by his or her "own conduct."' 31 The
"own conduct" requirement for imposition of the death penalty is
not an element of the offense but rather a triggering mechanism
that qualifies the case for the sentencing or death penalty phase of a
capital trial.32
Following a verdict of guilt for purposeful or knowing murder
by own conduct, the case then proceeds to a separate sentencing
28 Every judgment of conviction which result in a sentence of death ... shall
be appealed, pursuant the Rules of Court, to the Supreme Court. Upon the re-
quest of the defendant, the Supreme Court shall also determine whether the sen-
tence is disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both
the crime and the defendant. § 2C:I 1-3(e).
29 See § 2C:11-3(a)(1) ("Except as provided . . . criminal homicide consti-
tutes murder when [t]he actor purposefully causes death or serious bodily injury
resulting in death .... ) (alteration added); § 2C:11-3(a)(2) ("Except as provided
... criminal homicide constitutes murder when [t]he actor knowingly causes death
or serious bodily injury resulting in death .... ) (alteration added).
30 "Except as provided ... [i]t is committed when the actor, acting either
alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an
attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery,
sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terror-
ism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002,c. 26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such
crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person
other than one of the participants" § 2C:11-3(a)(3) (alteration added).
31 See § 2C:11-3(c) ("Any person convicted of murder under subsection (a)
(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct ... shall be sen-
tenced as provided hereinafter... "); State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301 (N.J. 1997).
32 See State v. Feaster, 716 A.2d 395, 412-13 (N.J. 1998).
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proceeding commonly referred to as the penalty phase.33 In this
second trial, a prosecutor is usually precluded from avoiding or
waiving the sentencing proceeding as a matter of law.34 Although
this would appear to be a direct statutory limit on prosecutorial dis-
cretion, this purpose is undermined by the fact that county prosecu-
tors.are required to file a notice of aggravating factors. In order for
the case to proceed in the second phase, a prosecutor must give the
defendant notice of which factors he intends to prove. A prosecutor
that deliberately or innocently fails to file the statutory notice of
aggravating factors can avoid the sentencing proceeding, however,
and allow the defendant to make a plea that results in life imprison-
ment instead of death. It is important to realize that the decision to
seek the death penalty is made very early in the case, before the
case even goes to trial. 35
During the sentencing proceeding, the State must prove be-
yond a reasonable doubt the existence of one or more aggravating
factors.36 These factors are legislative prerogatives as to which types
of murders should be eligible for the death penalty. If the jury or
the court determines, first, that any aggravating factor(s) exist; sec-
ond, that the aggravating factor(s) outweigh all of the mitigating
factors beyond a reasonable doubt, then the court will sentence the
defendant to death. 37 If the jury determines in the sentencing pro-
ceeding, however, that the aggravating factors do not outweigh the
mitigating factors, or the jury is unable to reach a unanimous ver-
dict, then the defendant is sentenced by the court to a term of life
imprisonment during which the defendant will not be eligible for
parole.38
33 See § 2C:11-3(c)(1) ("The court shall conduct a separate sentencing pro-
ceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death pursu-
ant to the provisions of subsection (b) of this section.
34 See § 2C:11-3(d).
35 See State v. Matulewicz, 557 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.J. 1989); State v. Gerald,
549 A.2d 792 (N.J. 1988).
36 At the proceeding, the State shall have the burden of establishing beyond
a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph
(4) of this subsection. The defendant shall have the burden of producing evidence
of the existence of any mitigating factors set forth in paragraph (5) of this subsec-
tion but shall not have a burden with regard to the establishment of a mitigating
factor... § 2C:11-3(2)(a); see § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(a)-(/) (listing the statutory aggravat-
ing factors that may be found by the jury or by the court).
37 See § 2C:11-3(b)(4).
38 See §§ 2C:11-3(b)(1); § 2C:11-3(c)(3)(b).
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B. Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion
The prosecutor enjoys a unique position in the criminal justice
system. He is vested with plenary authority to prosecute an of-
fender and unfettered discretion to offer plea-bargain to less in-
cluded offenses. In the context of the death penalty, however, one
could argue that such discretion often undermines the effectiveness
of representative government and the integrity of the fundamental
liberties guaranteeing individual freedom for all. For this reason,
one must understand the limitations (or lack thereof) on
prosecutorial discretion. These limitations may be viewed as consti-
tutional limitations, statutory limitations, and supervisory and pol-
icy limitations.
The office of the county prosecutor is created and fixed by the
New Jersey Constitution, which provides for nomination and ap-
pointment of county prosecutors for a fixed term by the Governor
with the advice and consent of the Senate. 39 Prosecutors are often
considered the "gate-keepers" of the criminal justice system. So
long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the defen-
.dant committed the crime for which he is accused, the prosecutor
may choose to prosecute or not to prosecute. 40 In New Jersey, the
Supreme Court has held that the primary duty of a prosecutor is to
obtain convictions and to see that justice is done.41
Although the government is generally afforded wide discretion
over whom to prosecute in our criminal justice system, that power is
not without constitutional limits. Even as constitutional officers,
prosecutorial discretion cannot exceed constitutional limitations. A
39 See N.J. CONST. art. VII, § 2, para. 1 ("[P]rosecutor ... nominated and
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate... " ); State
v. Laws, 242 A.2d 333, 342 (N.J. 1968) (citing the broad discretion that prosecutors
have in the conscientious discharge of the responsibilities of their office); Morss v.
Forbes, 132 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1957) (holding that the jurisdiction of the county prosecu-
tor is largely independent of control by the Attorney General but that the Attor-
ney General may intervene by way of super session or where specifically provided
by statute).
40 See McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 296 (1987); Wayte v. United States,
470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985); United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 380 (1982);
Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
41 See State v. Loftin, 680 A.2d 677 (N.J. 1996); State v. Zola, 548 A.2d 1022
(N.J. 1988).
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decision to prosecute may not be based on any impermissible fac-
tors such as race, religion, or some other arbitrary reason.
42
One of the attractive features of the death penalty statutes up-
held in Gregg, and subsequently adopted by many states, was the
system of statutory aggravating factors that classified all death-eligi-
ble murders. This directly limits the types of murders for which
prosecutors may seek the death penalty.43 Justice White in Gregg
explained that such a system would prevent the arbitrary and ran-
dom application of capital punishment and provide "'a meaningful
basis for distinguishing the few cases in which [the death penalty] is
imposed from the many cases in which it is not."' 44
County prosecutors in New Jersey are subject to the vague su-
pervisory authority of the Attorney General. Under the Criminal
Justice Act of 1970 the Attorney General is deemed the "chief law
enforcement officer of the State" who may "maintain general su-
pervision over ... county prosecutors with a view to obtaining ef-
fective and uniform enforcement of the criminal laws." 45 The
breadth of this authority remains uncertain, as the New Jersey Su-
preme Court continues to maintain that county prosecutors are
vested with broad discretionary powers to be exercised in the dis-
charge of their exclusive responsibilities under the law.46
42 See Wayte, 470 U.S. at 608; United States v. Schoolcraft, 879 F.2d 64, 68
(3d Cir. 1989); Gov't of Virgin Islands v. Harrigan, 791 F.2d 34, 36 (3d Cir. 1986).
43 See § 2C:11-3(c)(2)(a) ("[T]he State shall have the burden of establishing
beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any aggravating factors set forth in
paragraph (4).") (alteration added); PROSECUTORS' GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at
1. "The decision to file a statutory notice of aggravating factors.., one of the most
important charging functions to be performed by a County Prosecutor. It is
through this decision-making process that a prosecutor commits the entire re-
sources of the criminal justice system." Id. pmbl.
44 Gregg v. Georgia 428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976) (quoting Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972) (White, J., concurring)), cited with approval in State v.
Chew, 695 A.2d 1301, 1314 (N.J. 1997).
45 See § 52:17B-98, reprinted in BAIME II1, supra note 7, at 51; Wright v.
State, 778 A.2d 443 (N.J. 2001) (holding that "prosecutors are agents of the State
... discharging a State responsibility that the Legislature has delegated to county
prosecutors, subject to the Attorney General's right to supersede."); State v.
Caliguiri, 705 A.2d 1216 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998), affd and modified, 726
A.2d 912 (N.J. 1999) (holding that although Attorney General is State's chief law
enforcement officer county prosecutors are subject to the law as established by the
legislature and interpreted by the Supreme Court).
46 See State v. McCrary, 478 A.2d 339 (N.J. 1984); State v. Laws, 242 A.2d
333 (N.J. 1968); State v. LeVien, 209 A.2d 97 (N.J. 1965); cf. State v. Winne, 96
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In New Jersey, county prosecutors also adopted a set of guide-
lines to assist prosecutors in making death penalty decisions, the
Guidelines for the Designation of Homicide Cases for Capital Prose-
cution (hereinafter "Prosecutors' Guidelines").47 The Prosecutors'
Guidelines were adopted by all twenty-one counties in New Jersey 48
in response to a judicial mandate by the New Jersey Supreme
Court.49 These guidelines were created to prevent prosecutors from
injecting subjective bias into the system. 50 Although they are not
legally binding over the county prosecutors, they were promulgated
to make uniform the objectives of each county prosecutor in capital
murder cases.51 The guidelines call for the establishment of a com-
mittee in each office of the county prosecutor that will aid the indi-
vidual prosecutor in his/her decision to seek a capital indictment
and ultimately the death penalty.
C. Systemic Proportionality Review: Confirming the Suspicion?
The identification of county variance is a by-product of the
continuous dedication of the New Jersey judiciary to the task of
conducting proportionality review of all death sentences as man-
dated by section 2C:11-3(5)(e). 52 Individual proportionality review
under section 2C:11-3(5)(e) plays a vital role in ensuring that the
punishment fits the criminal so as to "ensure that the death penalty
is being administered in a rational, non-arbitrary, and even-handed
manner." 53 While individual proportionality review, or comparison
of individual death sentences to those sentences imposed in similar
cases, provides protection for individual defendants from biased
sentencing, systemic proportionality review entails the monitoring
of the death penalty system in the aggregate case. Through complex
A.2d 63 (N.J.- 1.953) (holding that prosecutor has a duty to exercise discretion in
good faith).
47 See PROSECUTORS' GUIDELINES, supra note 15.
48 See id.
49 State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 950 (N.J. 1988).
50 See PROSECUTORS' GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at pmbl. ("It is neither
desirable nor acceptable to have a capital charging standard dependent on individ-
ual attitudes.").
51 See id. ("These guidelines are not intended to... create any substantive or
procedural rights, enforceable at law by any party in any matter, civil or criminal.
The guidelines do not place any limitation upon the otherwise lawful prosecutorial
prerogatives of the Office of the County Prosecutor.").
52 See Koedatich, 548 A.2d at 950.
53 State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d 1059, 1068-70 (N.J. 1992).
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statistical comparison cases and the isolation of specific variables
such as race of the defendant, race of victim, and location of the
crime (thus county of jurisdiction), systemic review permits contin-
uous monitoring for disparities, for inconsistencies, and for imper-
missible influences.5 4 To carry out this monitoring function the
court has turned to the advice and recommendations of criminal
justice experts and of experts in disciplines other than the law.55
The first systemic proportionality review project, conducted by
Special Master David Baldus, under the direction of the Adminis-
trative Office of the Courts, created a database or "universe" of
cases from which to administer the statistical models.56 Through bi-
variate analyses and regression analyses, Special Master Baldus no-
ticed that the "data indicate that prosecutorial decisions play a
prominent role in determining which death-eligible cases advance
to a penalty trial .... [T]he exercise of prosecutorial discretion...
varies from one county to the next. '' 57 Nonetheless, the New Jersey
Supreme Court dismissed Baldus' statistical methodology due to
the inadequate number of comparison cases in the "universe" in
State v. Marshall.5 8 Almost ten years later, the Supreme Court
again renewed its dedication to developing a more reliable statisti-
cal model to measure the existence of racial bias in capital murder
sentencing. 59
. On August 2, 2000 the N.J. Supreme Court rendered its deci-
sion in In Re Proportionality Review Project, approving a new mul-
tifaceted statistical methodology to study systemic racial
54 See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 292 (N.J. 1987) (holding that a com-
parison of like cases was an efficient monitoring mechanism to determine whether
impermissible factors affected capital sentencing).
55 Id. at 293; see State v. Cooper, 731 A.2d 1000, 1007-08 (N.J. 1999).
56 BALDUS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 1-6.
57 Id. at 22-23.
58 See State v. DiFrisco, 662 A.2d 442 (N.J. 1995); State v. Bey, 645 A.2d 685
(N.J. 1994); State v. Martini, 651 A.2d 949 (N.J. 1994); State v. Marshall, 613 A.2d
1059 (N.J. 1992).
59 See RICHARD S. COHEN & PROFESSOR JOHN W. TUKEY, REPORT TO THE
NEW JERSEY SUPREME COURT: PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW 27 (1995). The New
Jersey Supreme Court appointed distinguished Professor Emeritus of Statistics at
Princeton University, John W. Tukey, as technical consultant to Special Master and
retired Superior Court Judge, Richard S. Cohen to review all data and issue find-
ings on designing a parsimonious regression model to study racial discrimination.
DAVID S. BAIME, SPECIAL MASTER, REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT: SYSTEMIC PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT 10-11 (Dec. 1, 1999).
980 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIX
discrimination or other impermissible factors.60 Although the pri-
mary goals of the study were to determine if ethnic, racial, or gen-
der bias affected the administration of the death penalty in New
Jersey, the study yielded unintended results that will be explained
further in this Note.61 Special Master Baime did not study county
variance further, nor did he offer any opinion on the existence of
this phenomenon.
Almost a year later, Special Master Baime presented his Re-
port to the New Jersey Supreme Court: Systemic Proportionality Re-
view Project 2000-2001 Term, which in addition to identifying
county variance concluded that racial or ethnic bias did not exist.62
This report confirms the earlier findings of Special Master Baldus. 63
County variance is the geographic variation between counties
in the rates that county prosecutors seek the death penalty (seek a
capital murder indictment) and the rates that convictions for capital
murder advance to the penalty trial phase, for all statutory "death-
eligible" murders.64 It is important to remember that Special
Master Baime's report revealed that the three urban counties com-
prising the highest number of death-eligible cases (Camden, Essex,
and Union counties) 65 have the lowest rate (21%) of advancements
to death penalty trials.66 The remaining eighteen counties, as a
whole, having a significantly lower volume of death-eligible cases,
had an average rate of advancement to the penalty trial of 42%.67
In fact, in only seven out of the twenty-one counties (1/3) the rate
of advancement to penalty trial was greater than 50%.68 Why do
60 In re Proportionality Review Project, 757 A.2d 168 (N.J. 2000) (adopting a
system that consisted of three different modes of analyses: (1) bivariate analysis
using race as the single independent variable, (2) parsimonious regression studies
to measure relationships between the statutory factors and death sentencing, and
(3) case sorting techniques to create combinations of factually similar cases to
identify the existence of racial discrimination).
61 See id. at 169.
62 BAIME III, supra note 7, at 51.
63 See generally BALDUS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23 (finding
county variances in death sentencing and penalty trial rates).
64 See id.
65 See BAIME III, supra note 7, at 44; WEISBURD & NAUS, supra note 7,
tbls.48-51.
66 See WEISBURD & NAUS, supra note 7, at 54, tbls.48-49 (comparing 445
death penalty cases, Camden County has 51 cases of which 25% advanced to the
sentencing proceeding; Essex County has 98 cases of which 19% went to the pen-
alty trial; Union County has 40 cases of which 18% went to penalty trial).
67 See id. tbl.50.
68 See id. at 53-54, tbl.48.
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prosecutors in the three urban counties with the greatest volume of
death-eligible cases produce the lowest rates of capital indictments
and penalty trials? Why is it that less urban and rural counties, with
a smaller volume of death-eligible cases, produce higher rates of
capital indictments and penalty trials? 69 Because Special Master
Baime's report does not address the causes of this county variation,
he offers no explanation and refers the matter to the attention of
the Attorney General under his supervisory powers.70 As noted
earlier the Attorney General has general supervisory powers over
the county prosecutor. 71
D. Beyond New Jersey: County Variance as a
Nationwide Phenomenon
The problem of county variance has also become noticeable in
other jurisdictions across the United States.72 In Nebraska, actual
studies were conducted to determine whether prosecutors, in the
exercise of their discretion, treat similarly situated defendants dif-
ferently on the basis of illegitimate or suspect factors.73 This study
found, in terms of geographic variation, just the opposite. The Ne-
braska study revealed that prosecutors in the major urban counties
apply different standards of willingness to waive the death penalty
unilaterally or to offer a plea bargain than do prosecutors elsewhere
in the state.74
For example, in Nebraska, death-eligible cases in major urban
counties are nearly twice as likely to advance to penalty trials as
death-eligible cases in greater Nebraska.75 The uneven application
of state law creates an "adverse disparate impact" on racial minori-
ties since almost 90% of the minority defendants charged with capi-
69 See id. (revealing that in suburban counties such as Mercer, Middlesex,
Monmouth, and Morris, the percentages of death penalty cases advancing to sen-
tencing proceedings were, respectively, 48%, 61%, 74%, and 57%).
70 See BAIME III, supra note 7, at 51 (commenting on how the data is un-
remarkable based on the densely populated yet heterogeneous nature of New
Jersey).
71 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 57:17B-98 (West 1995), reprinted in BAIME IIl,
supra note 7, at 51.
72 See NEBRASKA STUDY, supra note 18; VIRGINIA REVIEW, supra note 18.
73 See NEBRASKA STUDY, supra note 18, at 12.
74 See id. at 18.
75 Id. at 18.
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tal murder are prosecuted in major urban counties.76 The data
suggests, however, that despite the racial demographics, there is no
clear evidence of an adverse impact against minorities in the impo-
sition of death sentences.77
In addition to Nebraska's study, the Virginia General Assem-
bly responded to a general concern about the arbitrary manner in
which prosecutors apply the death penalty.78 The findings of the
Virginia study complement those of Special Master Baime's report,
namely, that prosecutors in high-density population or urban locali-
ties are (200%) less likely to seek the death penalty for a similar
death-eligible case than prosecutors in medium or low density
populations. 79 The Virginia study, however, went further to seek an
explanation for county variance of prosecutorial charging
decisions.8 0
The first major finding of the study was that prosecutors were
more likely to seek a capital murder indictment when the murder
victim was a female and the crime is committed in a non-urban ju-
risdiction.81 The most common reason elucidated by high-density
population prosecutors for not seeking a capital prosecution was
the "perceived reluctance of juries in high density population juris-
dictions to impose death sentences" when a prosecutor has sought
an indictment, tried a capital murder case, and received only a life
imprisonment in the penalty phase. 82 The second finding was that,
in cases where the defendant murders a family member or relative,
there is strong tendency for prosecutors to defer to the family's
76 Id. at 19. The effect of the difference in the rates that prosecutors advance
cases to penalty trials statewide based on geographic location is that minority de-
fendants face a higher risk that their cases will advance to penalty trial death
sentences than do white defendants similarly situated. Id.
77 See id.
78 See VIRGINIA REVIEW, supra note 18, at i, ii fig. (showing that out of 215
death-eligible offenses, 170 (79%) resulted in a capital murder indictment, 64
(30%) were prosecuted as capital cases, and 24 (11%) resulted in the death
penalty).
79 See id. at ix. Of 96 death-eligible cases in high-density population jurisdic-
tions, only 16% were elected for capital prosecution as opposed to the 78 cases in
medium density populations where prosecutors sought the death penalty in 45% of
the cases. Id.
80 Id. at vi.
81 Id. at 47-48.
82 Id. at 50.
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wishes regarding the death penalty.8 3 The third finding was that the
data strongly suggests that the geographic location of the offense
has the strongest effect on the likelihood that a person will face
capital prosecution; prosecutors in high-density areas were 87% less
likely to seek the death penalty in any given case than a prosecutor
in low-density localities. 84
III. COUNTY VARIANCE: A CONTINGENT
CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM?
While the specific causes of county variance remain unclear
pending further study, its very existence presents a new and com-
plex issue to the constitutional administration of the death penalty.
This issue is whether significant geographic variance in the rates
that county prosecutors seek the death penalty at various stages of
a death penalty case is in conflict with the individual civil liberties
guaranteed by the Fifth, 85 Eighth,86 and Fourteenth Amendments
to the U.S. Constitution.8 7 Although traditional empirical chal-
lenges to the death penalty have focused mainly on racial bias in
death sentencing, the U.S. Supreme Court forewarned in Furman v.
Georgia that facially non-discriminatory death penalty laws could
83 See VIRGINIA REVIEW, supra note 18, at 66 (noting a 78% lower
probability that the local prosecutor would ask for the death penalty than where
the victim and the defendant knew each other but were not related).
84 See id.
85 See Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (holding that, although the Fifth
Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause, it does contain an equal
protection component like the Fourteenth Amendment).
86 See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1972) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) ("[L]egal systems that permit [the death penalty] to be so wantonly and so
freakishly imposed" as "cruel and unusual punishment in the same way that being
struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."); Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
87 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 256-57 (Douglas, J., concurring) (holding that the
death penalty inflicted is "unusual" under the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause of the Eighth Amendment and Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment if it discriminates against a person by reason of his race, religion,
wealth, social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives
room for play of such prejudices); State v. McCrary, 478 A.2d 339, 350 (N.J. 1977)
(holding that the decisions by prosecutor to admit defendant to a pretrial program
has separation of powers implications); see generally U.S. CONST. amend. VIII
("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishments inflicted."); id. amend. XIV, ' 1("[No] State [shall] deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.").
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still offend constitutional principles if the laws operated to produce
freakish or arbitrary results that caused prejudice.88
Since Furman, the Court has held that the standard for deter-
mining whether there has been an abuse of prosecutorial discretion
requires a defendant to prove both that other persons similarly situ-
ated were not prosecuted (discriminatory effect) and that the deci-
sions to prosecute were based on impermissible factors such as race,
religion, or some other arbitrary reason (discriminatory intent).8 9
Discriminatory intent, the Court admitted, would be difficult to
identify through empirical analysis since it requires specific and
concrete proof.90
Since the Court's decision in Gregg v. Georgia, a small minor-
ity on the U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the inherent flaws of
the post-Gregg death penalty systems, including the abuses arising
from unbridled prosecutorial discretion. U.S. Supreme Court Jus-
tices William Brennan and Thurgood Marshall were perhaps the
most outspoken critics of the post-Gregg death penalty laws. First,
the Justices believed that these schemes failed to channel
prosecutorial discretion. This discretion had to be "suitably directed
and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capri-
cious action." 91 They noted, however, that there are no standards
by which prosecutors make decisions and no supervisory authority
providing a system of checks and balances. 92 Secondly, the Justices
also claimed that the non-waiver of sentencing proceeding provi-
sion of section 2C:11-3(d) of the New Jersey Code of Criminal Jus-
tice, which was intended to prevent prosecutors from waiving the
sentencing proceeding, was easily circumvented by a prosecutor's
88 See Furman, 408 U.S. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring) ("Any law which is
non-discriminatory on its face may be applied in such a way as to violate the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
89 See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456 (1996); Personnel Adminis-
trator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979); Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous.
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977); Washington. v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); United
States v. Pretlow, 779 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J. 1991).
90 McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292-93 (1987) (explaining that discrimi-
natory intent cannot be conclusively inferred because aggregate statistic measures
of the total sentencing outputs of the death penalty system encapsulate the deci-
sion-making of prosecutors, jury panels, or other agencies, which each make their
own subjective determinations and that discriminatory effect requires a showing
that similarly situated individuals were treated differently).
91 See DeGarmo v. Texas, 474 U.S. 973, 975 (1985) (mem.) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
92 Id. at 975.
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acceptance of a plea agreement or by the prosecutor's willful failure
to file a notice of statutory factors as required under section 2C:11-
3(c). 93
A. Constitutional Implications of County Variance in New Jersey
Until the specific causes of county variance can be isolated and
defined, few conclusions may be made about the degree of constitu-
tional tolerance of county variance. This is not to suggest that such
disparity in decision-making between county prosecutors should
not raise concern. Special Master Baime himself was clearly unwill-
ing to speculate on the implications of his findings. 94
What could cause county variance? It could be that prosecutors
in suburban and rural counties have more resources per capita case
than do the urban counties that have a significantly higher volume
of death-eligible cases. It may be that prosecutors in these urban
counties are guided by extra-legal notions such as their perceptions
about jury behavior 95 and the effects of race of the defendant or
race of victim on the likelihood of receiving a conviction. County
variance may be the result of personal individual beliefs or political
pressures.
A determination of the root causes of county variance remains
an important task in the years ahead. The N.J. Supreme Court
seems ready to pursue the issue and has committed its resources to
address the seemingly excessive discretionary powers exercised by
the county prosecutor. The Legislature must also reconsider the
current system of legislative and judicial checks and balances on
county prosecutors. 96
B. Failure to Channel Discretion: An Aggravating Reality
The New Jersey death penalty statute, section 2C:11-3 of the
N.J. Code of Criminal Justice, was intended to channel jury and
prosecutorial discretion through the creation of specific categories
93 See Eddmonds v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 894 (1984) (mem.) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
94 See BAIME III, supra note 7, at 5 ("It is arguable that the county in which
a death-eligible crime takes place should not influence whether a case is capitally
prosecuted. We offer no opinion of this subject .... ).
95 See BALDUS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
96 See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3(c)(4)(a)-(l) (West 1995 & Supp.
2003); State v. McCrary, 478 A.2d 339, 350 (N.J. 1984); PROSECUTORS' GUIDE-
LINES, supra note 15.
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of aggravated murder that would be eligible to receive the death
penalty.97 The statutory factors encompass three main aspects of
criminal culpability that justify imposing the death penalty: moral
blameworthiness, victimization (terror or suffering), and the defen-
dants' character and prior criminal record. 98 Special Master Baldus
suggested that the degree of both moral blameworthiness, victimi-
zation, and defendants' character and prior record were significant
factors in understanding prosecutorial decision-making. 99
The statutory aggravating factors in section 2C:11-3(c)(4)(a)-
(1) were adopted with the expectation that prosecutors would exe-
cute the law to its fullest extent where the facts and circumstances
so warranted. After the adoption of the current death penalty stat-
ute, however, the trend between 1982-1989 was a significant decline
in the frequency with which death-eligible cases advanced to the
penalty trial.100 Overall, this resulted in a gradual decline in penalty
trial death-sentencing rates continuing to the present time. 101 From
1983 to 2001, out of 515 death-eligible cases, only 184 (36%) of the
total death-eligible cases advance to a penalty trial.' 0 2 This means
that, despite a statutory prohibition against a prosecutor's waiver of
the sentencing proceeding after a capital conviction, prosecutors
nonetheless eliminate 2/3 of all death-eligible murders through the
exercise of their discretion. Of the 184 penalty trials that were con-
ducted, only 56 (11%) resulted in a sentence of death. 0 3
97 See § 2C:11-3(b), (c).
98 See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 230 (N.J. 1987); BALDUS FINAL RE-
PORT, supra note 1, at 72-73 (explaining the relationship of specific aggravating
factors to concepts such as moral blameworthiness and victimization).
99 See BALDUS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 72-73.
100 See id. at 19 (reflecting the rates at which death-eligible cases advance to
penalty trials); DAVID C. BALDUS, SPECIAL MASTER, DEATH PENALTY PROPOR-
TIONALITY REVIEW PROJECT, INTERIM REPORT TO THE NEW JERSEY SUPREME
COURT tbl.3A (May 29, 1990) [hereinafter BALDUS INTERIM REPORT] (showing in
column B that the proportion of death-eligible cases advancing to a penalty trial is
60% or 118/198) (on file with the New York Law School Journal of Human
Rights).
101 See BALDUS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 15 (indicating that before
1988, 21% or 29/140, while the overall rate after 1987 was 6% or 5 out of 187
cases).
102 HONORABLE DAVID S. BAIME, REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER ON
PROPORTIONALITY REVIEW: State v. Steven Fortin, at A-1 (Sept. 18, 2001) [herein-
after FORTIN Proportionality Review].
103 See id.
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Given the failure of prosecutors to prosecute most death-eligi-
ble capital murders, it seems likely that the statutory factors do not
adequately define contemporary notions of death worthiness. So,
although some types of murders are considered death-eligible by
statute, very rarely will murders with certain aggravating factors re-
sult in a sentence of death. 104 Only three specific aggravating fac-
tors, section 2C:11-3(4)(a) ("defendant had a prior murder
conviction") (67% 6/9); section 2C:11-3(4)(d) ("victim was a public
servant") (67% 2/3); and section 2C:11-3(4)(c) (depravity of mind)
(50% 1/2), result in jury death sentences most of the time. 05
In a further analysis called "salient factors," relevant non-stat-
utory factors called "aggravating circumstances" were identified. 0 6
These aggravating circumstances are mainly subcategories of spe-
cific aggravating factors under section 2C:11-3(4)(a)-(l). 10 7 Most
studies have never focused on prosecutor decision-making and the
influence of specific aggravating circumstances on the decisions of
prosecutors. Thus, it certainly seems time to expand the salient fac-
tor studies to consider the aggravating circumstances which may
drive prosecutorial discretion. The danger of such broad discretion
is that there have been virtually no limits to what prosecutors may
consider in making this decision. 10 8 The result, as Justice Handler
explained, is unprincipled, unguided, and arbitrary. 10 9
C. The Ineffectiveness of the Prosecutors' Guidelines
In State v. Ramseur, the New Jersey Supreme Court first ad-
dressed the inconsistency of prosecutorial charging practices. 110 The
104 See BALDUS INTERIM REPORT, supra note 100, at tbl.3A (demonstrating
in Column C that the aggravating factors that were less likely to result in death
penalty trials were: 4(g) "Arson" (33% 3/6), 4(g) "Burglary" (17% 1/6), 4(c) "De-
pravity of Mind" (33% 2/6), 4(f) "Escape or detection" (0% 0/2)).
105 Id.
106 BALDUS FINAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 84.
107 See id. (revealing some "aggravating circumstances:" 4(a) (defendant had
a prior murder conviction), 4(h) (police officer victim), 4(d) and 4(e) (contract
killing), 4(g) (multiple victims, violent sexual assault, highly aggravated residential
burglary and robbery).
108 See id. at 139-41.
109 See State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 974, 975 (N.J. 1992) (mem.) (Handler, J.,
dissenting).110 See State v. Ramseur, 524 A.2d 188, 293 (N.J. 1987) (stressing the unique-
ness of prosecutorial discretion in determining a defendant's death eligibility and
the concerns arising from the lack of consistency or coherence in the exercise of
that discretion).
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court held that, although it is clearly the domain of the prosecutor
to determine whether to seek a capital prosecution, it was deeply
concerned about consistency in the exercise of this discretion.'11 In
furtherance of its commitment to channel prosecutorial discretion,
and achieve more consistent and reliable results, the New Jersey
Supreme Court recommended in Koedatich I that the State "adopt
guidelines for use throughout the state by prosecutors in determin-
ing the selection of cases."' 1 2 The County Prosecutor Association
and the Attorney General responded by adopting the Prosecutors'
Guidelines. I13
These guidelines consist of seemingly general statements about
the relevant objectives of a prosecutor during the pre-indictment
decision-making process.' 1 4 Moreover, the Prosecutors' Guidelines
are not legally binding on the prosecutors in the discharge of their
official duties. 115 Because these guidelines place no real limitations
and provide no substantive standards on which to base decisions,
they fail to effectively limit prosecutorial discretion.
The first guideline establishes a committee in each of the
twenty-one county prosecutors' offices to assist the prosecutor in
his or her individual determinations as to death eligibility." 6 The
committee reviews the statutory aggravating and mitigating factors
in specific death-eligible cases in order to determine whether a capi-
tal prosecution is warranted. 117 The committee ultimately should
also assist the decisions of individual prosecutors.' 18 These guide-
lines do not provide detail on how the committee may discharge
"I See id.
112 State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 955 (N.J. 1988).
113 See PROSECUTORS' GUIDELINES, supra note 15.
114 See generally id. at 3-5.
115 These guidelines are not intended to, and should not be relied upon to
create any substantive procedural rights, enforceable at law by any party in any
matter, civil or criminal. These guidelines do not place any limitation upon the
otherwise lawful prosecutorial prerogatives of the Office of the County Prosecu-
tor.... See id. pmbl.
116 See id. guideline 1 (requiring that a committee be established within each
county prosecutor's office to review each homicide case pursuant to the capital
murder statutes).
117 See id.
118 See id. ("Each county prosecutor shall establish within his office a commit-
tee to review every homicide case pursuant to the statute and guidelines, to assist
the prosecutor in the prosecutor's determination as to death eligibility.").
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their duties as an advisory board, or what function the committee
should serve in the overall decision-making process. 119
Guidelines two through four require that that the prosecutor
make determinations based on his or her professional judgment as
to whether there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defen-
dant, by his own conduct, actively and directly participated in caus-
ing the death of the victim, or procured the commission of the
homicide by payment or promise of anything of pecuniary value. 120
Guidelines two12 1 and four 122 require that prosecutors be satisfied
that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of
one or more aggravating factors. Again, the guidelines place no real
constraints on prosecutors and fail to describe what criteria or types
of evidence should be considered in making particular decisions. 123
Guideline six states that after a prosecutor is satisfied that the State
will be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravat-
ing factors outweigh the mitigating factors, the case is then desig-
nated a "Capital Case. '1 24
The integrity of the Prosecutors' Guidelines was first chal-
lenged in the dissent of Justice Handler of the New Jersey Supreme
Court in State v. Jackson. 125 In that case, the county prosecutor in-
dicated that he would accept a plea to non-capital murder, which
would carry a sentence of thirty years to life imprisonment without
the chance of parole. 126 One day later, the prosecutor withdrew his
plea offer and proceeded to prosecute the defendant for capital
murder.127 On appeal the defendant challenged the prosecutor's be-
119 See State v. Jackson, 607 A.2d 974, 978 (N.J. 1992) (mem.) (Handler, J.,
dissenting).
120 See PROSECUTORS' GUIDELINES, supra note 15, at guidelines 2-4.
121 The prosecutor, in determining whether or not a case is death-eligible,
must be satisfied that there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant,
by his own conduct, actively and directly participated in causing the death of the
victim, or procured the commission of the homicide by payment or promise of
payment of anything of pecuniary value.
122 Id. guideline 3. Id. guideline 4 ("The prosecutor must be satisfied that
there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt of the existence of at least on statutory
aggravating factor.").
123 See id.
124 Id. guideline 6.
125 See 607 A.2d 974 (N.J. 1992) (mem.) (Handler, J., dissenting).
126 See id. at 974, 974.
127 See id.
990 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. [Vol. XIX
havior as an abuse of the system, indicative of the arbitrary and
capricious nature of the New Jersey death penalty law.128
The behavior of the county prosecutor in Jackson illustrates
the problems associated with unbridled prosecutorial discretion.
First, numerous contacts were made by the county prosecutor to the
victim's family to ascertain their feelings on punishing the defen-
dant with death. 129 Justice Handler believed that county guidelines
failed to prevent prosecutors from considering irrelevant, improper,
and prejudicial evidence. Even more troubling is the fact that the
judge candidly urged the prosecutor to make these contacts. 130 In
fact, after informing the judge that the prosecutor would not seek
the death penalty, the judge expressed his displeasure with the
State's opinion and commented, "If any case deserved the death
penalty it is this one."' 131 While judges generally have the power to
accept or deny plea arrangements based on the facts and circum-
stances of the case, 132 rendering personal opinions or feelings about
a particular case may transgress the province of the judiciary.
Based on his discussions with the presiding judge, the prosecu-
tor changed his decision and notified the trial judge and defendant's
counsel that the State would seek the death penalty.133 The prose-
cutor admitted that he believed not seeking the death penalty in
Jackson's case would set a precedent against securing the death
penalty in other highly aggravated future cases.134
The Prosecutors' Guidelines have resulted in a capital-murder
regime that is "unprincipled and unguided" in the words of Justice
Handler. "Prosecutorial charging practices are so inconsistent and
disparate that the end results have become irretrievably arbitrary
and capricious."'1 35 He further characterized the Prosecutors'
128 See id. at 975.
129 See id. This should not be confused with victim impact evidence that
courts will permit the state to introduce during trial.
130 See id.
'31 Id. at 976.
132 The Court in its discretion, may refuse to accept a plea of guilty and shall
not accept such a plea without first addressing the defendant personally and deter-
mining by inquiry of the defendant and others, in the court's discretion, that there
is a factual basis for the plea and that the plea is made voluntarily, not as the
results of any threats or any promises or inducements not disclose on the record,
and with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the
plea. N.J. C. R. 3:9-2; see State v. Davis, 561 A.2d 1082 (N.J. 1989).
133 See Jackson, 607 A.2d at 976.
134 See id.
135 Id. at 975.
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Guidelines as "vague and unfocused" and that they ultimately
failed to perform the function of assisting prosecutors in the process
of evaluating the evidence and the factual circumstances in the deci-
sion-making process. 136
IV. PLACING REAL LIMITS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
A. Comparative Analysis of Prosecutorial Decision-Making
The existence of county variance may tend to confirm the un-
settling truth about the effects of unbridled prosecutorial discretion
on the administration of capital punishment in New Jersey.137 Aside
from the obvious inequalities of geographic disparity in rates of
prosecution, the current laws allow prosecutors to eliminate over 2/
3 of all death-eligible cases without standards, without supervision,
and without a system of checks and balances. 138 The time to revisit
and reconsider capital punishment in New Jersey has arrived.
The New Jersey Supreme Court and the Attorney General
must jointly conduct a comprehensive inquiry into the causes of
county variance and its effects of the administration of capital pun-
ishment. The Commonwealth of Virginia conducted a study, led by
the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) that
focused on three issues. 139 First, the study sought to explain the va-
riation in decisions by county prosecutors to seek indictments for
capital murder for all persons charged with a capital offense. 140 Sec-
ond, the study sought to determine the factors that influence prose-
cutors to seek the death penalty in capital cases.141 Importantly, the
study focused on whether prosecutors based their decisions on arbi-
trary or extra-legal factors such as the defendants' race.1 42 Third,
136 Id. at 978.
137 See generally BAIME III, supra note 7.
138 See FORTIN Proportionality Review, supra note 102, at A-1. The individ-
ual proportionality review pursuant to section 2C:11-3(e) conducted for Steven
Fortin's death sentence indicates the current death sentencing and penalty trial
rates among N.J. death-eligible cases, 1983-2001. Out of 515 cases the proportion
of death-eligible cases that advanced to a penalty trial was 184/515 (36%). Id. So,
prosecutors eliminate a little less than 2/3 of all death-eligible cases with their dis-
cretion, because a case may only advance to a penalty trial if a prosecutor decides
pre-indictment to pursue the death penalty.
139 See VIRGINIA REVIEW, supra note 18, at 28.
140 See id.
141 See id.
142 See id. Examples of extra-legal factors could also be the gender of the
victim, the type of community where the crime was committed, socio-economic
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the study sought to determine how to distinguish between cases re-
sulting in death sentences from those where a sentence of death was
considered but not imposed. 143
To carry out the study, the JLARC conducted detailed file re-
views of all death-eligible cases from 1995 to 1999144 and mailed
surveys to over 121 local prosecutors. 145 The survey responses were
then electronically tabulated to assist in the analysis of
prosecutorial discretion. 46 The goal of the file reviews was to sup-
ply data for case comparisons. 47 Unlike New Jersey, Virginia does
not have a centralized database containing detailed information on
murder cases which can be used for analysis; instead it used arrest
records issued by the Virginia State Police and the Sentencing Com-
mission of the Virginia Supreme Court.148
The study characterized localities by population density. 149 A
cluster sampling technique was used to select the sample of cases
for the study, organizing each locality studied into one of three non-
overlapping clusters: high-density population, medium density pop-
ulation, and low-density population.tSo Sample weights were given
to each county to account for the higher percentage of cases in the
high-density clusters. 151
Mail surveys of Commonwealth attorneys also supplemented
the statistical studies employed by the JLARC. Each of the local
status of both the defendant and the victim, and the relation of the defendant to
the victim.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 29. This date is significant in Virginia because after 1995 parole
for the death penalty was abolished. The study reflects only those death-eligible
cases during that period. Id.
145 See id.
146 See id. (indicating that the primary sources used by the JLARC included
criminal indictment records, reports on descriptions of crimes, court transcripts,
demographic data on the defendants and the victims, autopsy reports, forensic evi-
dence reports, prosecutor witness files, criminal history data on defendants, and
pre and post investigative reports compiled by the Department of Corrections).
147 See id.
148 See id. at 30.
149 See id. at 31 tbl.8 (distributing death-eligible cases throughout high, me-
dium, and low-density localities). Note that while only 21% of the counties sur-
veyed were considered high-density population (urban) localities, they account for
45% of the total death-eligible cases during the study period. Id. In contrast, me-
dium density localities amounted to 43% of the counties studied but accounted for
only 36% of the total cases. Id.
150 See id. at 32.
151 See id. at 34-35.
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prosecutors of the State was surveyed regarding the policies and
practices associated with the application of death penalty stat-
utes.1 52 Prosecutors were questioned about the factors they consid-
ered in deciding how to proceed with capital eligible case and what
their rationale was for plea agreements in capital murder cases. 153
In January 2003, Maryland released An Empirical Analysis of
Maryland's Death Sentencing System With Respect to the Influence
of Race and Legal Jurisdiction after the study was commissioned by
former-Governor Parris N. Glendening. 54 The study concluded
that the jurisdiction in which a case is prosecuted is an important
factor.155 The study characterized the variation in the treatment of
cases across different jurisdictions as "statistically significant. 1' 56 It
also found significant variation in the determinations of prosecutors
to file a notification of aggravating factors and the determinations
to retain or withdraw the notification.157 There was no significant
variation across legal jurisdictions, however, concerning the ad-
vancement of a case to a penalty trial once a conviction for the
underlying capital murder was returned. 58
Like the Virginia study, the Maryland study sought to deter-
mine what factors affected prosecutor decisions. The Maryland
study concluded that race of the victim greatly affected a prosecu-
tor's decision to file a statutory notice of aggravating factors and
the decision to withdraw that notice. 159 The study concluded that
African-Americans who kill whites are more likely to receive a stat-
utory notice of aggravating factors, that prosecutors are less likely
to retract that notice, and that African-Americans are more likely
to be sentenced to death. 60
152 See id. at 35.
153 See id. at 35.
154 See PROFESSOR RAYMOND PATERNOSTER ET AL., AN EMPIRICAL ANALY-
SIS OF MARYLAND'S DEATH SENTENCING SYSTEM WITH RESPECT TO THE INFLU-
ENCE OF RACE AND LEGAL JURISDICTION, FINAL REPORT 1-131 (2003)
[hereinafter MARYLAND STUDY].
155 Id. at 25-26.
156 Id at 25.
157 Id. at 1-3.
158 Id.
159 See id. at 1-5.
160 Id.
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
B. Creating Real Limits on Prosecutorial Discretion
Until substantive guidelines are developed which are binding
and which may be enforced by a supervisory authority, unbridled
discretion will continue. These guidelines must define the criteria
relevant to capital decision-making. 161 Perhaps these guidelines
might consist of a list of non-statutory and statutory factors, similar
to Special Master Baldus' "salient factors," that would enable pros-
ecutors to make better decisions.162 If the "salient factors" model
could be expanded to include such non-statutory factors as educa-
tional background, history of drug or alcohol abuse, employment
history, or things like remorse for victims' families, capital prosecu-
tion outcomes could be monitored more predictably.
These non-statutory factor guidelines could be very useful in
distinguishing what types of cases would or would not result in the
death penalty. For example, the proportion of death-eligible cases
advancing to a penalty trial for a murder of a police officer is 9/10
or 90%.163 Similarly, the rate of advancement to penalty trials for
murders where the defendant had a prior murder conviction is 25/
37 or 68%.164 The non-statutory factors would allow prosecutors to
determine why the one case involving a murder of a police officer
did not result in a penalty trial. What factors were different in the
twelve cases where the defendant had a prior murder conviction but
which resulted in avoidance of a penalty trial? Likewise, the rate of
advancement for murders involving a grave risk of danger to an-
other person is only 3/45 cases or 7%.165 What made prosecutors in
those three cases decide to advance the case to a penalty trial?
A substantive guideline would be most beneficial in the "mid-
range" of cases, where convictions are most unpredictable. 166 It is
here that prosecutorial decisions may have the greatest potential to
be arbitrary and capricious. Moreover, the presence of aggravating
circumstances or varying levels of mitigation make prosecutorial
charging decisions a technical, if not scientific, process. For in-
161 See PROSECUTORS' GUIDELINES, supra note 15.
162 See FORTIN Proportionality Review, supra note 102, at A-1.
163 See id.
164 See id.
165 See id.
166 See id. The aggravating factors that fall within the category of the moder-
ate range of death-eligible cases include purposeful and knowing murder by the
defendant's own conduct involving a sexual assault, a robbery, depravity, burglary,
and arson. Id.
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stance, where robbery is the aggravating factor at issue, there is a
35% death-sentencing rate for robberies committed in residential
areas, however, prosecutors are generally more reluctant to prose-
cute these cases (25% or 14/56 cases). 167 Even though factual and
evidentiary circumstances will vary greatly, prosecutor decisions
must be studied in greater detail.
In addition to new substantive guidelines, the Office of the At-
torney General should review all death-eligible cases for potential
abuses of discretion by creating an ad- hoc committee to review all
death-eligible cases on a case-by-case basis. Perhaps prosecutors
could be required to notify the Attorney General of their intent
before seeking an indictment and after a conviction for capital mur-
der. The review of prosecutor decisions by the Attorney General is
within the supervisory powers of his office. 168 Although prosecutors
are constitutionally appointed officers and separation of powers is-
sues remain, the power of the county prosecutor should not go
unchecked.
V. CONCLUSION
The post-Gregg death penalty laws, like the one adopted in
New Jersey, have allowed prosecutors to exercise virtually unbri-
dled discretion in capital murder cases. Without standards to base
their decisions and without a higher authority to hold them ac-
countable, county prosecutors continue to apply the capital murder
laws of New Jersey in a freakish and arbitrary manner. Special
Master Baime's study has confirmed that the capital murder laws in
New Jersey operate very much like being struck by lightning.169
The solutions to county variance go beyond mere statistical
formulas and data comparison. A major overhaul of capital punish-
ment law in New Jersey is required at all levels of government. This
process must begin, however, with a comprehensive study of
prosecutorial behavior and decision-making. The data yielded by
such an inquiry will permit lawmakers to identify what new substan-
tive limits are needed to successfully reduce the amount of
prosecutorial discretion in capital cases. Only once we begin to fully
167 See id. at A-1.
168 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 57:17B-98 (West 1995), reprinted in BAIME III,
supra note 7, at 51.
169 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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understand the flaws in the system, can we balance the scales of
justice and provide equality for all.170
Joseph R. McCarthy
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